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DELIVERY OF DEED BY GRANTOR TO
GRANTEE ON ORAL CONDITION
Chillemi v. Chillemi'

The parties to this action, husband and wife, purchased
certain property in Bethesda, Maryland, in January 1946.
In September of that year the husband who was employed
in the War Department, was ordered by the government to
go on a possibly dangerous mission to Japan and China.
Because of the uncertainty of his return and despite the
parties' discordant marital life, the husband consented to
execute deeds conveying to his wife the property held by
them as tenants by the entireties. This conveyance was on
condition that the wife would not record the deeds until
such time as he "should have been reported missing, killed,
or had failed to return" and that if he should return the
deeds would be destroyed or returned to him. The husband's stay in the Far East was shorter than anticipated
and he arrived home in December 1946 at which time he
requested return of the deeds. The wife refused and instead
caused the deeds to be recorded. The parties ceased to live
together as man and wife and the husband filed suit in the
Circuit Court for Montgomery County to enjoin his wife to
reconvey the property to him and her as tenants by the
entireties. The lower court declared the deeds null and
void, accepting the oral evidence. The Court of Appeals
affirmed, holding that it is the intention of the grantor of a
deed that determines whether the delivery of the deed is
absolute or conditional even though the delivery is made
by the grantor directly to the grantee and the condition be
only an oral one.
After many years of discussion and much litigation on
the subject, the effect of a conditional delivery of a deed,
complete on its face, directly by the grantor to the grantee
is still in question.2 The courts faced with this question
have decided it by choosing one of four views held on the

subject. The first, and without question the view most
generally held in this country, is that a deed cannot be
delivered to the grantee on an oral condition and that
178 A. 2d 750 (1951). *
2 Ballentine, Delivery in Escrow and the Parole Evidence Rule, 29 Yale
Law Journal 826 (1920) ; Tiffany, Conditional Delivery of Deeds, 14 Columbia Law Review 389 (1914).

1951]

CHILLEMI v. CHILLEMI

such a delivery is absolute with the parole conditicn being
treated as having no effect whatever.'
The second view, which has been taken by some of the
American courts, holds that if there is a conditional delivery and the grantor's intent is that delivery should not
take effect immediately, there is then in fact no real delivery.4 The courts taking this stand allow the fact of non
delivery to be shown by parole evidence.
The third view takes the position that the conditional
delivery does not represent any delivery at all until the
condition has been fulfilled. However, when the condition
has been met the delivery is then treated as being absolute
and the deed becomes immediately operative.5
The fourth and final view on this question treats conditional delivery of a deed by grantor directly to the grantee
the same as if the delivery had been made to a stranger to
hold in escrow for the grantee.
While the view referred to first has been said by renowned writers to be a relic of the primitive formalism
which attaches some peculiar efficacy to the physical transfer of the instrument as involving a symbolical transfer of
the property,7 that view still certainly represents the predominating opinion on the subject in this country. The
reasoning of the courts so holding is apparently predicated
on their belief that any recognition of an oral condition
might lead to the unsettling of titles and land records. An
effort to break away from this so called "primitive formalism" has lead to the development of the other views referred to.
Since there were divergent views on the subject it was
not strange to find the Maryland Court of Appeals undecided as to which doctrine it would apply when it was faced
with this situation for the first time in Buchwald v. Buchwald.5 In that case a father wished his son to have certain
realty but wanted to preclude the son's wife having any
claim on the property if the son predeceased the father.
To accomplish this end he delivered the deed to his son on
821 C. J. 874 and 26 C. J. S. 251; Wipfler v. Wipfler, 153 Mich. 18, 116
N. W. 544 (1908) ; Mays v. Shields, 117 Ga. 814, 45 S. E. 68 (1903) ; Sweeney
v. Sweeney, 126 Conn. 391, 11 A. 2d 806 (1940) ; Chaudoir v. Witt, 170 Wis.
556, 174 N. W. 925 (1919) ; 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 941.
'Phelps v. Pratt, 225 Ill. 85, 80 N. E. 69 (1906) ; Gaylord v. Gaylord, 150
N. C. 222, 63 S. E. 1028 (1909).
5 Whitaker & Fowle v. Lane, 128 Va. 317, 104 S. E. 252 (1920).
6 Supra, n. 2; 9 WIGmouE, EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1940), Sec. 2408.
'WIGMORE, op. Cit, supra, n. 6, Sees. 2405, 2408; 4 TIFFANY, REAL PuOPpmTy
(3rd ed. 1939), Sec. 1049.
8 175 Md. 115, 199 A. 800 (1938).
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condition that it be held in a safe and not be recorded until
the father's death and that if the son predeceased his father
he would then retake and destroy the deed. In deciding
this case, the Court of Appeals said that there could not
be a delivery of a deed to the grantee in escrow and quoted
with approval 21 C. J. 874:
"'A deed absolute on its face cannot be deposited by
the grantor with the grantee therein named to be held
by the latter in escrow; such a deposit becomes a delivery which operates to vest absolute title in the grantee immediately'."
The Court then went on to say that there cannot be a valid
delivery of a deed to the grantee named in it on a condition
not expressed in the instrument. However, after stating
these rules they went on to say that manual tradition is
insufficient and that transfer must be with intent that the
deed shall presently become operative and effectual. They
then found that the deed had been given to the son for
safekeeping and without intent that it become presently
operative and that this was not a present grant but an
attempted testamentary disposition of property and there
had been no effective delivery. Thus while citing authority
for the first and most widely accepted view, the Court
actually ended up applying the second view which treats
such a delivery as no delivery.
The courts have broken away from the old theories of
the inviolate character of all written documents merely
because they are in writing. It is now generally accepted
that the rule prohibiting parole evidence to modify a simple
written contract doesn't exclude evidence to show that the
written instrument was delivered subject to a condition.
The Virginia case of Whitaker & Fowle v. Lane9 contains
a comprehensive discussion with reference to whether
parole evidence may be admitted to show that even a sealed
instrument was delivered subject to an oral condition. It
further illustrates the trend in American thought on the
subject to apply to sealed contracts the same rules applied
to unsealed contracts. This case completely disregarded
the effect of a seal and held that a parole condition that it
shall not be effective except upon fulfillment of a larger
transaction of which it is a part, may be attached to a sealed
contract for the purchase of realty.
However, the courts have been in most jurisdictions
reluctant to apply the same thinking to a deed. Yet, at the
9Supra, n. 5.
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prodding of Wigmore and Tiffany"° it appears that at least
some courts are departing from the old and established
rules. As illustrative of this trend we are referred to a
Tennessee case where a mother executed and delivered to
her son a deed to contain property." The son died before
his mother leaving all his property to his wife who caused
the deed to be recorded. The court found that there had
been a conditional delivery with an intent that the deed
not take effect until after the mothers death. In setting
aside the deed the court said:
"The rule seems well settled in Tennessee that it is
the intention of the grantor of a deed or the maker of a
note that determines whether a delivery of an instrument is absolute or conditional even though delivery
be made to the grantee of the deed or the payee of
the note."
The Tennessee court therefore represents those jurisdictions which state that the intention of the grantor is conclusive and will govern.
It seems from the instant case that Maryland has now
taken a similar position and has definitely cast aside the
majority view that a purported conditional delivery directly
to the grantee is an absolute delivery.
The courts in this country are in accord with the principle that it may be shown that a deed was delivered without any intent that it take effect, for example, where a deed
has been delivered to a party merely for purposes of examination and without intent that title pass.' These courts
are in fact looking at the intention of the grantor and
determining that there has been no delivery at all. It
seems strange therefore that in the same jurisdictions it
must be held that a deed can't be manually transferred with
a conditional intent without being an absolute delivery
even though the parties did not so intend. Thus, where a
deed is handed to the grantee only for purposes of examination the courts will look to the act of delivery and find
no intent to pass title. They consider all of the circumstances and in effect say that the delivery is really an act
which expresses no intent that the deed be valid from that
time on. Although you might expect that these courts
would be also equally willing to say that a deed delivered
subject to a condition is merely evidence of an intent that
10

Supra, n. 7.
n Tanksley v. Tanksley, 145 Tenn. 468, 239 S. W. 766 (1922).
Curry v. Colburn, 99 Wis. 319, 74 N. W. 778 (1898).
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the deed not take effect until an event has occurred, they
have been reluctant to do so. However, of their failure to
apply such reasoning Tiffany has said:
"That the mere physical transfer of the instrument
should, in any jurisdiction, be allowed to override the
grantor's explicit declaration of intention that the instrument shall not be immediately operative, is a striking illustration of the persistence
of the primitive form18
alism before referred to."'
The Maryland Court, in deciding the instant case, must
have had this squarely in mind and seems clearly to have
adopted the philosophy of Wigmore and Tiffany in their
approach to the problem. They refused to apply the law
which had been set out in Buchwald v. Buchwald 4 and unequivocally said that there is no logical reason why a deed
should not be held in escrow by the grantee as well as by a
stranger. The Court held the ancient rule to be inapplicable
to present day conditions and stated that conditional delivery:
"... is purely a question of intention, and it is immaterial whether the instrument, pending satisfaction
of the condition, is in the hands of the grantor, the
grantee, or a third person. '
In thus holding that the intention of the grantor will
alone determine the effect of a delivery, Maryland has
broken away from the strict views entertained by most
other jurisdictions on this problem and has apparently accepted the theories of Wigmore and Tiffany. It remains to
be seen whether this modern approach will lead to the unsettling of titles and undermining of the certainty of our
recording system as some writers and many other jurisdictions contend.
Supra, n. 2, 391.
Supra,n. 8.
Supra, n. 1, 753.

